Abstract-Internet of Things (IoT) commonly identifies the upcoming network society where all connectable devices will be able to communicate with one another. In addition, IoT devices are supposed to be directly connected to the Internet, and many of them are likely to be battery powered. Hence, they are particularly vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks specifically aimed at quickly draining battery and severely reducing device lifetime. In this paper, we propose SMACK, a security service which efficiently identifies invalid messages early after their reception, by checking a short and lightweight Message Authentication Code (MAC). So doing, further useless processing on invalid messages can be avoided, thus reducing the impact of DoS attacks and preserving battery life. In particular, we provide an adaptation of SMACK for the standard Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). Finally, we experimentally evaluate SMACK performance through our prototype implementation for the resource constrained CC2538 platform. Our results show that SMACK is efficient and affordable in terms of memory requirements, computing time, and energy consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is commonly used today to refer to the growing information technology trend towards a networked society, where all devices that can benefit from a connection will be connected with one another [1] [2] . This means that, unlike the past paradigm where mainly computers and mobile phones were globally interconnected over the Internet, now all kinds of electronic equipment are about to be available online. This trend is expected to accelerate in the next years, thanks to the decreasing cost of hardware platforms and network devices, as well as the maturity of the Internet technology.
However, many IoT devices feature limited resources, and are likely to be battery powered. Also, many of them are used in sensitive or even critical tasks, such as industrial plant control and health monitoring application scenarios. Thus, if devices run out of battery power and stop functioning, they can possibly cause severe damage or injuries to people, and result in further costs to perform system recovery, as well as battery replacement or recharge. Hence, it is vital to preserve device battery life as much as possible.
A common low-level approach to reduce energy consumption consists in allowing devices to switch to sleep mode to quickly verify whether received messages are valid or not, i.e. if they have been possibly sent by illegitimate sources. In such a case, devices can avoid performing useless additional parsing and processing, so considerably reducing the damage that an attacker can cause in terms of energy consumption, and thus preserving battery life. Also, we suggest a tunable and adaptive reaction mechanism that can be adopted upon detecting invalid messages, so specifically addressing Denial of Sleep attacks, and forestalling battery exhaustion.
We provide an adaptation of SMACK for the CoAP protocol that does not require to modify the original message format. Nevertheless, SMACK is based on a general approach, and can be integrated in other protocols at any communication layer. Besides, we experimentally evaluate SMACK performance through our prototype implementation for the resource constrained CC2538 platform. Our results show that SMACK is efficient and affordable in terms of memory requirements, computing time, and energy consumption. Also, when compared to DTLS, our approach detects invalid messages while displaying a smaller computing overhead, and requiring no additional communication with the constrained device.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss related works. Section III describes the considered application scenario, while Section IV overviews the CoAP protocol. Section V presents SMACK and how it can be adapted to CoAP, while in Section VI we propose a reactive strategy to address DoS attacks upon their occurrence. Section VII discusses a possible way to perform the short MAC computation, while in Section VIII we show how the administrative key material can be generated. Section IX describes a possible way to adapt the generation of CoAP Message IDs, while in Section X we provide a performance evaluation of SMACK. Finally, in Section XI, we draw our conclusive remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Battery exhaustion has been considered a real and severe threat for a long time now. In 1999, Stajano and Anderson suggested that a malicious node could perform a sleep deprivation torture attack, i.e. behave with the only purpose to consume the victim's battery energy [5] . Then, a number of relevant works have stressed the severity of Denial of Sleep attacks, both in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and in general mobile computer environments [4] [6] . More recently, even energy attacks on server systems have been considered as a possible serious threat to deal with [10] .
In [6] , the authors identify three different forms of sleep deprivation attack: service request; benign; and malignant power attacks. In service request attacks, the adversary repeatedly performs valid service requests to the victim device, to drain its residual energy. In a benign attack, she induces her victim to indefinitely perform a valid but energy-hungry process. In a malignant power attack, she compromises devices and alters their original behavior to increase energy consumption.
Several works about detection techniques against Denial of Sleep attacks have been presented, often based on traffic analysis or other anomaly detection mechanisms. In [11] , the authors describe B-SIPS, a system based on an innovative Dynamic Threshold Calculation algorithm that alerts upon detecting power changes. Specifically, it considers running activities, and compares their energy consumption with the expected one, looking for possible anomalies. In [12] , Bhattasali and Chaki propose a probabilistic model to detect Denial of Sleep attacks, based on Absorbing Markov Chain (AMC). In particular, they associate the Markov Chain absorption time with the network lifetime, and assume that a Denial of Sleep attack is being performed in case the system state converges to network death too fast with respect to the expected battery discharging trend. Unfortunately, as highlighted in [4] , such solutions based on intrusion detection techniques normally require to capture and analyze a large amount of network traffic, which can be difficult or even unfeasible for many resource constrained IoT devices.
Other presented approaches rely on traditional security services, especially at the link layer. In [6] , the authors propose a power-secure architecture, relying on multi-layer authentication and energy signature monitoring. It aims at processing only requests that deserve a high level of trust, and identifying intrusions that would result in the execution of energy-hungry services. However, apart from the general suggestions, no concrete schemes to achieve battery drain robustness have been proposed in [6] . Nonetheless, it is claimed there is a real need for an early and lightweight message authentication check, in order to withstand battery drain attacks. In [13] , Raymond and Midkiff present CARL, a rate limiting approach based on current host-based intrusion detection techniques. Specifically, CARL performs attack detection at the link layer, considering messages to be legitimate only if both authenticated and not replayed. Then, the rate of malicious traffic is determined by comparing maintained information on recent messages, and actions based on rate limiting are taken to mitigate the attack effects, trading network lifetime with network throughput. In [4] , Raymond et al. consider different attacks against a number of link layer protocols, and prove that Denial of Sleep attacks can be easily performed, with no need to break link layer encryption. In order to mitigate the impact of such attacks, they propose a framework based on link layer authentication, replay protection, and jamming identification.
The above mentioned detection approaches based on traditional security services are likely to result in a not negligible overhead, especially in terms of energy consumption [8] . Also, in case security services at the link layer are adopted, message validity must be checked by every network node in the path between the source and destination endpoint. Of course, this results in a further non negligible impact on network performance as a whole. Moreover, it requires to establish secure trust relationships among all involved nodes in the communication path (e.g. through pairwise cryptographic keys), thus likely failing in efficiently providing protection against Denial of Sleep attacks from an end-to-end standpoint.
Unlike the solutions mentioned above, SMACK is a proactive security service that promptly and efficiently recognizes invalid (and likely hostile) messages upon their reception, in order to detect Denial of Sleep attacks. It has been designed to address mainly service-requesting attacks, but represents a valid countermeasure also against benign attacks [6] . As described in Section V, SMACK relies on a short and lightweight Message Authentication Code (MAC) in order to check validity of messages early after their reception, and avoid any additional and unnecessary parsing efforts on non valid ones.
III. APPLICATION SCENARIO AND THREAT MODEL
We consider an application scenario where an adversary can easily perform a Denial of Sleep attack against a resource constrained device. With particular reference to a service request attack [6] , the adversary can repeatedly send request messages to the device relying on unicast or multicast communication, so inducing it to continuously parse and process them upon their reception. Hereafter, we refer to such requests sent by the adversary as invalid messages. Furthermore, the considered attack would prevent the device from possibly switching to sleep mode, i.e. it would be unable to stop its network interface activities in order to reduce power consumption. Also, the device might be induced to execute operations requested by the adversary, with additional damage in terms of service availability and energy consumption.
As a consequence, as well as affecting network performance and application availability, the considered attack severely impacts on the device energy consumption, thus drastically reducing its battery lifetime. Thus, we believe it is vital to distinguish between valid and non valid request messages as soon as possible once they have been received by the device, as we further discuss in Section VI.
However, at the same time, we would like to avoid that only a single entity has access right to the constrained device, which must actually be available to all authorized clients having such a permission. A natural way to address this is considering a model where a client, before requesting a service to the device, needs to obtain an authorization to perform such a request. Similarly to the model described in [14] , we assume that such decisions are taken by a dedicated centralized entity. By offloading the whole authorization procedure to a central entity, a lot of computational overhead can be avoided on the constrained device side. In particular, we assume that the implemented policies allow the central entity to effectively determine whether to issue an authorization to a requesting client. In the considered scenario, we rely on such a central entity as a pure key manager, i.e. a Key Distribution Center (KDC), but it can be utilized also as a more general authorization server as described in [14] . Note that, in practice, the KDC can be implemented either as a real centralized entity or according to a distributed architecture. With respect to an approach based on proxies, this model has the advantage that the actual client and server communication at the end user application does not require any particular adaptations. In the rest of this paper, we refer to the application scenario depicted in Figure 1 , and consider the presence of three distinct entities, namely an IoT device D, a client C, and the KDC.
We assume that device D is associated to the KDC, and that they are in a mutual trust relationship. Also, D and the KDC share a symmetric cryptographic master key K M , which is not directly used for secure communication, but only to generate other security material, as described in Section VIII. In the following, we assume that K M has been established before device deployment, during the initial configuration phase of device D, also referred as imprinting [5] . Note that, in real IoT scenarios, the KDC would reasonably provide also other services, such as the authorization procedure mentioned above. Hence, key management does not practically require to introduce a dedicated key infrastructure.
In order to communicate with one another, the involved entities C, D, and the KDC rely on the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [3] . Communication can be possibly secured, i.e. exchanged messages may be protected to assure that application security requirements are met. To this aim, the CoAP specifications recommend to adopt the DTLS protocol. Further details about specific cryptographic means adopted to secure communication are out of the scope of this paper.
Before starting to communicate with device D, client C first contacts the KDC, in order to obtain: i) a cryptographic session key used by SMACK to process messages addressed to D; and ii) a valid Message ID to be used for the first one of such messages. We provide more details about management of session keys and Message IDs in Sections VIII and IX.
IV. COAP OVERVIEW
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [3] is a standard web transfer protocol, for use with constrained devices and networks (e.g. low-power and lossy). It is intended especially for machine-to-machine (M2M) applications, such as smart energy and building automation, and runs over UDP, thus not assuming reliable message transport. Also, it is not sessionbased and can handle loss or delayed delivery of messages. Figure 2 depicts the structure of a CoAP message. The first byte contains the protocol version Ver, a type field T with basic message type information, and the size in bytes of the Token field, namely TKL. The Code field contains more precise message type information, while the Message ID field is a unique ID used to track messages and detect possible duplications. The optional Token field can be used to match request and response messages, and its values should be generated at random as well as uniquely for each request. The field ranges between 0 and 8 bytes in size, aims at making CoAP more robust against IP-spoofing attacks, and its usage is strongly recommended in case security is not provided at the transport layer. Furthermore, several different CoAP options have been defined, and it is possible to specify a list of them according to a Type-Length-Content scheme. Finally, the CoAP message content is included in the Payload field.
So far, no specific security related procedures have been defined for the CoAP protocol. Instead, it is recommended to adopt DTLS [7] if authentication, integrity, or confidentiality are required. However, using DTLS to provide protection against battery drain attacks might not be the best solution, since it requires the execution of a complex handshake procedure, which is itself a considerable target for DoS attacks.
V. MESSAGE VALIDITY CHECK
If we consider resource constrained, typically battery powered, devices and their need to limit energy consumption, then it would be better if they could early and easily check if received messages come from legitimate sources or not. Such a procedure should be compatible with the adopted communication protocol stack, and should allow for detecting invalid messages as early as possible upon their reception. Also, it should be as lightweight as possible, i.e. efficient in terms of computing overhead and resulting energy consumption.
Early detection of message validity for battery drain prevention is applicable to many communication scenarios. How to actually use such an approach strictly depends on the considered protocols and communication technologies. However, we believe it is interesting to address battery drain prevention with particular reference to constrained embedded devices. Hence, we chose to design our approach so that it is primarily tailored to CoAP. That is, in the rest of this paper, we assume that SMACK is adopted at the application level, and relies on the CoAP protocol. Nevertheless, SMACK is general, and can be potentially adopted at any layer in the communication stack, by introducing a short MAC value in the regular message header.
More in detail, SMACK relies on early checking a short MAC, thus promptly asserting if a given message can be considered valid or not upon its reception. So doing, in case of invalid (possibly forged) received messages, it is possible to avoid further parsing and verification procedures, thus saving a consistent amount of energy, and extending battery life. Also, if several invalid messages are received in a very short time interval, the recipient device may assume that a DoS attack is being performed, and can adopt reactive countermeasures in order to limit its impact (see Section VI).
The goal of our approach is to provide a good protection against battery drain attacks, while displaying very low complexity as well as an affordable computing and energy overhead. To this end, we rely on short Message Authentication Codes (MACs), computed by means of security material derived from the shared master session key K M , and refer to unconditionally secure MACs [15] , which, even if small in size, provide a very high level of protection. We recall that, unlike traditional message integrity and authenticity checks, the main purpose of SMACK is early checking the validity of CoAP messages, in order to detect (likely) ongoing Denial of Sleep attacks, and reduce their impact on energy wasting.
Given its format and position within the CoAP message, we believe it is perfect to rely on the Token field to include the short MAC, as a validity check information. Specifically, upon finalizing an outgoing CoAP request message, the sender client produces a 16 bit random Request ID R. Such a value is used to actually correlate the request message with its associated response, which is the main purpose of the CoAP Token field [3] . Further details about how R is generated are out of the scope of this paper. Then, SMACK computes a 16 bit short MAC SM , according to the procedure described in Section VII, which takes the concatenation of the following pieces of information as a 6 byte input: i) the 4 byte CoAP header, i.e. the Ver, T, TKL, Code and Message ID fields; and ii) the 2 byte Request ID R. Finally, both R and SM are included within the Token field of the CoAP message. Specifically, as depicted in Figure 3 , the Request ID R and the short MAC SM are carried in the Request ID and the Validity check subfield of the Token field, respectively. Note that, since the short MAC computation can be considered a pseudo random function, SMACK assures that the Token field as a whole always carries a random value.
VI. REACTIVE STRATEGIES
Together with the message validity check based on short MAC, device D can rely on an additional strategy, aimed at reacting in case too many invalid messages have being received. In fact, while it is reasonable to accept occasional invalid messages, due to the lack of reliability in adopted communication protocols, repeated errors and frequently failed validity checks should be treated as a deliberate DoS attack. Invalid messages. If message M conveys an invalid short MAC and CE S is lower than threshold T R E , i.e. CE S < T R E , then CE S = CE S + 1. Instead, if CE S = T R E , device D assumes that a DoS attack is occurring, and stops any network activity related to session S, for a predefined time interval t S . For instance, it can terminate session S, or even turn off the network interface. Once the time interval t S has elapsed, counters CE S and CA S are reinitialized to 1, and new messages are accepted within session S. Note that the mechanism described above can be further enhanced, by making the device more sensitive and suspicious about DoS attack detection. For instance, in case CE S goes over threshold T R E after a predefined short time or short amount of received messages, then device D can decrease T R E by a fixed value. As a result, the adopted reaction policy against DoS would be triggered after a minor number of invalid messages has been received. Further details about adaptive detection and reaction policies are out of the scope of this paper, and are left for further investigation.
VII. SHORT MAC COMPUTATION
In this section, we describe how SMACK computes short MACs introduced in Section V. Note that the procedure we suggest here is just one among several possible ways to perform the short MAC computation. However, since the resulting output is an unconditionally secure MAC [16] , and algorithms used to produce it have been extensively studied in terms of correctness and complexity, we strongly believe that the suggested method is close to be optimal in terms of simplicity and computational efficiency.
Having defined the short MAC to be 16 bits in size, we assume that elements involved in the short MAC computation are 16 bits in size as well. This is only for the sake of simplicity in the following description, while it is clearly possible to rely on elements of different sizes. Since CoAP does not include a session concept [3] , in the following we refer to a session as a sequence of messages exchanged between the same client C and device D over a short amount of time.
We denote GF ( 2 16 
Since a 2 can be precalculated and it does not change throughout the whole session, computing a short MAC v i requires only three additions and three multiplications 2 in GF (2 16 ), thus resulting to be extremely efficient. i . In case of a positive match, D considers the message to be valid, i.e. it assumes that the message has been sent by a legitimate source. Further, more in-depth, checks to verify the authenticity of message M i can then possibly take 1 Since we are interested in protecting the device from battery drain attacks, we focus only on messages from the client to the device, and do not consider the opposite communication direction. 2 In case special hardware for field calculations is not available, it is possible to adopt an even more efficient scheme, where a prime field GF (p), p > 2 16 , is used instead of a GF (2 16 ) field. So doing, only simple and extremely efficient mod p operations are necessary. However, this means that slightly larger keys, i.e. 17 instead of 16 bits in size, are needed for the inner operations, and the key consumption is consequently slightly larger as well.
place, according to other security mechanisms provided by the application or, in general, by the adopted communication stack.
As a final note, even though the process in Equation 1 displays a very small computational effort, short MACs produced as output still display a low probability to be forged by an external adversary, as we prove in the following theorem.
Proposition 1:
Given that the key values a, b, and c i in Equation 1 are truly random, a successful forgery attack against a short MAC produced by SMACK occurs with probability equal to 2 −15 .
Proof: It follows from Construction 2 and Theorem 2.3 in [16] that, given a block code E with parameters (n, M, d) and a random selected key k = {a, b, c}, a, b, c ∈ GF (q), then the MAC tag v for message M , v ∈ GF (q), is calculated as
where e a (M ) denotes the a-th code symbol in GF (q) for message M , and has a probability of successful impersonation or substitution attack which is independent of the computing power of the attacker, and is equal to
The short MAC computation we show in In this section, we describe a possible approach to derive the security keys a, b, and c i used for the short MAC computation (see Section VII). We recall that all the three keys are 16 bits in size.
With reference to the application scenario depicted in Figure 1 , we denote by K M the master key shared between the device D and the Key Distribution Center KDC. We recall that the establishment of K M is part of the device imprinting process, that we assume to take place at deployment time. Also, K M is not directly used to secure communication, but only to produce further key material. Finally, D and the KDC store a pre-shared randomly generated number of sufficient length (e.g. 256 bits), namely seed, which is used together with K M to generate additional security material.
The proposed key derivation procedure relies on a suitable pseudo random function P RF (·) [19] commonly agreed by both the KDC and D, which we assume to produce a 256 bit output. There are many available and well known pseudo random functions, including HMAC functions [20] based on the MD5, SHA1, and SHA2 hash functions. Although some of them display a relatively high computational complexity, our key derivation procedure does not require to invoke P RF (·) as often as SMACK performs the short MAC computation, thus limiting the resulting processing overhead.
After device deployment, both D and the KDC uses K M and seed to derive a master session key K MS as follows.
Hereafter, K MS is used on the client (device) side to produce the actual key used to compute (verify) short MACs conveyed by CoAP messages. Also, K MS needs to be regularly renewed through an update procedure, and securely provided to device D. Possible schemes according to which such a key redistribution actually takes place are out of the scope of this paper.
When contacted by C, the KDC replies providing it with: i) the initial Message ID ID * to be used in the first CoAP message addressed to D in this session; and ii) a session key K S , which is valid for the current session only, and is computed as
If we define K Sj as We discuss a possible method to generate initial Message IDs in Section IX. Note that, since CoAP Message IDs are only 16 bits in size, it may not take a long time before the KDC generates an already used initial Message ID, regardless of whether the very same client C, or a different one, is involved. Thus, before providing a client with an initial Message ID already used together with the current K MS , the latter must be renewed and securely provided to D.
IX. MESSAGE ID MANAGEMENT
In this section, we describe how new initial Message IDs can be generated and managed, and how device D is supposed to process them upon receiving CoAP messages.
A. Message ID generation
As described in Section VIII, SMACK relies on a session key K S to process CoAP messages within the same session. However, in order to avoid replay attacks, it must be assured that a different fresh session key is used at every session. Thus, the adopted Message ID generation strategy must be such that the same initial Message ID is not reused together with the same master session key K MS . In the following, we propose a scheme where the KDC generates fresh initial Message IDs. where ID * i−1 is the initial Message ID associated to the previous session S i−1 , and p > 2 is a suitable prime number, of the order of 100, pre-shared by the KDC and D. Once the new initial Message ID ID * i has been determined, it is used to generate a new session key K S according to Equation 6 .
After that, the KDC provides client C with K S and ID * i . Then, C starts to communicate with device D, using ID * i as the Message ID of the first sent CoAP message. Given the key generation scheme described in Section VIII, after having sent the very first message of a new session, the client C must receive a confirmation of correct reception on the device side. That is, client C can transmit further messages in the same session only after such a confirmation has been received.
Since the Message ID value is incremented by 1 every time a different message is exchanged between C and D [3] , then a new session must be established, i.e. a new initial Message ID must be generated, when: i) the same client C has sent p messages to D in the same session; or ii) a different client C contacts the KDC and requests to communicate with D.
The proposed scheme makes it possible to use the whole Message ID space without duplication, so that different sessions are associated with different session keys K S . However, although it might take a practically long amount of time, the Message ID generation process described above eventually gets "exhausted", once the KDC has used all the 
B. Message ID processing
Upon receiving a CoAP message, device D must check if the conveyed Message ID is fresh, in order to prevent replay attacks. However, since CoAP is a connectionless protocol, it is possible that messages are received in an arbitrary order. Hence, we propose a sliding window approach to handle messages that can possibly arrive out of order. Device D maintains the state information reported in Table  I . We assume that, during the imprinting process, D has been provided with a valid value for ID F , i.e. the initial Message 
X. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate SMACK, we developed a prototype implementation for resource constrained platforms. In this section, we show that, even with no particular optimizations, our implementation displays an affordable overhead in terms of memory requirements, computing time and energy consumption. Also, when compared to DTLS, our approach detects invalid messages while displaying a smaller computing overhead and requiring no additional communication with device D.
For our tests, we considered a commodity PC as CoAP client C, featuring 16 GB of RAM and an Intel i5-3470 CPU, and running the Java SE runtime environment. The client ran our extended version of the Java library Californium, which provides both the CoAP and DTLS protocols [21] . As CoAP server D, we considered a resource constrained device based on the CC2538 platform [22] , featuring a 32 MHz CPU, and provided with 512 KB and 32 KB of flash memory and RAM, respectively. The server ran our extended version of CoAP provided by Contiki and based on the Erbium library [23] . Also, we referred to the tinydtls library implementing the DTLS protocol for resource constrained platforms [24] . For simplicity, we considered the initial message ID and session key K S as pre-loaded on C. To enable communication between C and D, we relied on an additional router node based on the same CC2538 platform and running the Contiki operating system. Finally, we used the Energest framework provided by Contiki to collect time measurements on device D. Energest has been proven to accurately estimate energy consumption and increase the computing time only of the 0.7% [25] .
Compared to the original CoAP protocol provided by Contiki, our implementation of SMACK, even without any particular optimizations, results in additional 1.65 KB (+1.01%) of memory on device D, including also an H-MAC function (i.e. the same one adopted by DTLS [7] ). In contrast, providing support for DTLS through the tinydtls library results in additional 37.39 KB (+22.71%) of memory on device D.
We ran a set of experimental tests on a local network, considering a system not running any security services and a system relying on DTLS. More in detail, we first ran our test environment in the presence of CoAP only. Then, we relied on the very same set-up, with the additional presence of DTLS to secure communication. Finally, we ran the very same experiments considering CoAP together with SMACK only, without the presence of DTLS. This set of experiments allows us to compare overheads in terms of increase in the CoAP message exchange length, and additional computing time and energy consumption, with respect to a system including either only CoAP or both CoAP and DLTS. All results have been averaged over 20 independent replications, and confidence intervals have been derived, with 95% confidence level.
To keep this comparison as fair as possible, we considered the DTLS cryptosuite TLS PSK WITH AES 128 CCM 8 [26] , which is accounted as suitable to compact implementations and constrained devices. In fact, it is based on a preshared key handshake, hence avoiding more resource consuming operations based on public keys. Also, although it provides both confidentiality and data origin authentication, it is based on a single authenticated encryption operation.
A single test consists of 10 CoAP message exchanges, Table II shows the TL values collected on the client side. With respect to the CoAP ONLY test case, we can observe that the TL slightly increases in the presence of SMACK, and further increases in the presence of DTLS. As expected, such increments become smaller when communication has reached a steady state. On the other hand, if we consider the first transaction, DTLS results in a TL which is roughly 10 times greater than in the CoAP ONLY and CoAP SMACK test cases. This is mainly due to the execution of the complex DTLS handshake, upon establishing a new DTLS session. Such results are consistent with the fact that, with respect to SMACK, the DTLS protocol performs more complex security operations, and requires the transmission of larger messages. Now, we evaluate the processing time on the server side. In particular, we refer to the following two metrics.
T CPU T
: total time spent to perform SMACK or DTLS operations on a received message M 1, in the test cases CoAP SMACK and CoAP DTLS, respectively. This takes into account also initialization and management of data structures, as well as the DTLS handshake for the test case CoAP DTLS. T
CPU S
: time specifically spent to check the validity of a received message M 1. In the test case CoAP SMACK, it considers the short MAC check performed by SMACK. Instead, in the test case CoAP DTLS, it encompasses the decryption and authenticity check performed by DTLS. Table III shows the computing overhead on the server side. As expected, the computing times T
CP U T
in the first transaction are always sensibly higher than the ones in the last transaction. Also, the total computing overhead T particularly efficient against DoS attacks inducing the establishment of new communication sessions. Furthermore, we can observe that, in steady state conditions, the overall energy consumptions E T and E CP U T due to SMACK are the 27.13% and 26.62% less than the same ones due to DTLS, respectively. Besides, the energy consumptions E S and E
CP U S
due to the actual short MAC check are the 33.81% and 34.3% less than the same overheads due to DTLS security operations. It follows that the message validity check based on the short MAC proves to be considerably more efficient than standard authentication techniques, and thus is a good choice to efficiently detect DoS attacks and reduce their impact on constrained devices.
Note that, during out tests, we did not benefit of any power saving mode available on the CC2538 platform. As a result, once a CoAP message has been entirely received, the radio interface remains active in reception mode, as long as the message processing is completed. This explains why, both for the first and last transaction, we always have E T E
CP U T and E S E

CP U S
, even though SMACK does not require any additional communication on the server side. Of course, energy consumption can be further reduced by properly exploiting power saving modes available on the considered platform.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have presented SMACK, a security service aimed at reducing the impact of Denial of Sleep attacks against resource constrained IoT devices. SMACK relies on a short Message Authentication Code (MAC) to early and efficiently detect messages sent by illegitimate sources. This avoids additional parsing and processing on invalid messages, reducing the impact of Denial of Sleep attacks. We have provided an adaptation of SMACK for the CoAP protocol, and experimentally evaluated its performance on our prototype implementation for the constrained CC2538 platform. Results show that SMACK is sustainable and efficient in terms of memory footprint, computing time, and energy consumption. Also, when compared to DTLS, it detects invalid messages while displaying a smaller computing overhead, without requiring any additional communication with IoT devices. Future works will evaluate SMACK together with additional reaction mechanisms in the presence of different DoS attacks, and consider secure schemes to renew long-term key material.
